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INTRODUCTION
!
During recent decades the size of industrial process plants has
been rapidly increasing and, consequently/ designers/ users, and
society have in general been forced to consider the effects of
accidents more carefully, and to take into account the need for
protection against large consequence events which, of course,
will be of very low probability. Efficient industrial production
is tied to large production units, \ghich means large concen-
• » * • • •
tration of energy and materials. Therefore, hazard potential
cannot be removed completely, and the aim must be efficient
hazard control. The complexity of modern process plants together
with the rapid technological development/ when combined with the
low probability of the hazards we are attempting to control, lead
to the situation where risk analysis and control cannot be based
on empirical design guides and standards. Instead it will re-
quire a quantitative analysis of the risk of a system/ based on
empirical data on the properties of the components and parts
of the system. If we sketch the anatomy of an accident in a
modern industrial plant, it turns out that the human element
often plays a very significant role in the overall performance
of the system. Consequently, an increasing effort is being put
into the study of human error analysis and quantification. Un-
fortunately, the need for results has been growing more rapidly
than the research needed to supply the basic knowledge on human
functions in industrial installations and the related human
failure mechanisms. Accordingly, the following review will be
as much a review of problems as a survey of possible solutions.
However, if the conditions under which present methods are
applicable can be stated explicitly, then these conditions can
be used as design criteria for systems by serving as "criteria
of analysability11. Those criteria can then be modified or re-
leased as more efficient methods of analysis and better data
become available.
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RISK ANALYSIS, THEORY, AND PRACTICE
i
When considering the role of the human element in industrial
reliability and safety analysis, it is worthwhile to discuss the
relation between risk analysis and the actual, real life risk of
losses due to accidental events.
The outcome of a risk analysis of an industrial plant or system
is a theoretical construct which rentes empirical data de-
scribing functional and failure properties of components and
parts to a quantitative or qualitative statement of the overall
risk to be expected from the operation of the system. This
relation is derived from a definition of the boundaries of the
system considered, a model describing the structure of the
system and its functional properties invthe relevant normal and
accidental states together with a number of assumptions made to
facilitate the mathematical modelling. These assumptions, the
model, and the source of the empirical data, are equally as im-
portant parts of the risk analysis as the resulting statement
of risk level. Therefore, in the overall judgement of the risk
potential of the system, it is necessary to consider different
categories of risk:
Accepted risks. These are the risks related to the states of
accidental maloperation and the causes and effects considered
in the analysis. It goes without saying that any risk of
unacceptable magnitude uncovered during an analysis will result
in a change of the design. The functiohs of the operating staff
in the operation and maintenance of the system will be an
important part of this analysis.
Oversights and design errors. The quality of a risk analysis
depends upon the completeness of the analysis. In modern complex
industrial installations based on very large production units,
an important contribution to the overall risk is due to "major
loss11 situations of very low probability, often resulting from
a complex chain of events.including coincidence of errors and
a priori improbable failure modes. Therefore, sources of risk
hidden behind an incomplete analysis become a major problem.
Whether such discrepancies between the analytical model and the
- 5 -
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actual plant are considered to be design errors or errorß of
analysis depends on what is taken for given. The problem of
verifying the completeness of an analysis in general and thus
insuring that a safety-related design target has been met/ can
very probably lead to the need for criteria related to ''design
for risk analysability11.
Errors of management. The value of a risk analysis largely
depends upon the degree to which th^"'actual, operating plant will
satisfy the conditions and assumptions underlying the analysis.
Again/ this largely depends upon the managerial organization of
the plant. This type of risk is related to such activities as
planning of quality control, inspection, and testing in order to
ensure that the components and parts of the plant do match the
populations forming the base for the empirical data, and that
the plant is built according to the design specification and
will not be subject to modifications and changes without proper
risk evaluations. This relates to the technical equipment as
well as to selection, training, and organization of operating
staff and design of work procedures and instructions.
It lies in the nature of oversights and errors of management
that they are tied to human errors, but it also lies in the
variety and complexity of organizations and design activities
that quantitative risk modelling in these areas is practically
impossible. However, a comprehensive qualitative analysis has
been made by Johnson (1973).
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SYSTEMATIC METHODS VERSUS EXPERT JUDGEMENT
• I " *
The following discussion of the systematic analysis of the hu-
man role in system reliability and safety will be concerned with
the analysis behind the first category of risk discussed in the
previous section (i.e. accepted risks). It follows from the
nature of things that oversights are not included, while errors
of management are related to a lack of fulfilment of the basic
assumptions of the systematic
However, what is meant by "systematic analysis11 is not always
evident and invites some discussion. In the present paper,
systematic method will be synonymous to engineering analysis
when viewed as the alternative to expert judgement, which is
taken to be more akin to the performance of a professional
art. This distinction also seems to be a distinction which could
characterize the difference between reliability engineering and
the behavioural sciences.
In general, engineering analysis is based on quantitative data
and invariate relations applied to systems and structure which
are accessible to inspection or control. Practically speaking,
the opposite is the case for the behavioural sciences which
depend upon personal/ professional skills. It is a "well-known
fact that the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the
observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to the
person following them11 (Polanyi 1958) . This also applies to expert
judgement which depends upon what Polanyi calls "connoisseurship":
"Whereever connoisseurship is found operating within science or
technology we may assume that it persists only because it has
not been possible to replace it by a measurable grading. For a
measurement has the advantage of greater objectivity as shown
by the fact that measurements give consistent results in the
hand of different people all over the world, while such objec-
tivity is rarely achieved in the case of physiognomic appreci-
ations. The large amount of time spent by students of chemistry,
biology and medicine in their practical courses shows how greatly
these sciences rely on the transmission of skills and connoisseur-
ship from master to apprentice. It offers an impressive demon-
stration of the extent to which the art of knowing has remained
unspecifiable in the very heart of science11 (Polanyi, op.cit.).
This is an important problem when the aim is to include human
error analysis and quantification in an engineering analysis of
system reliability. Clearly, great care should be taken when
including human behaviour in engineering models. In addition, a
drastic limitation in the cases which can be handled must be
expected, if the analysis is to be based on formalized, system-
atic methods rather than on expert judgement.
/
Of course the importance of this aspect depends upon the appli-
cation of the reliability and safety analysis. If the analysis
is used for a relative ranking of different alternative sol-
utions during system design, a number of conditions can be
considered equal, and the criteria for analysability will lead
to less tight constraints compared with the situation where
the analysis aims at a verification or documentation of the
design target in terms of quantitative risk level.
A special problem is caused by current developments of large
computer codes for overall system reliability and safety analy-
sis. This development is ahead of the formulation of acceptable
models of human functions and error mechanisms in the systems
under consideration.
Consequently, the only solution for the time being is to include
simplistic models of human performance. To be compatible, such
models are depending on the mathematical or logical structure of
the program rather than on psychological properties. This is
acceptable as long as such human error models are used only for
sensitivity analysis, to determine the range of uncertainty due
to human influences. If quantitative risk figures are derived,
these should be qualified by the assumptions underlying the
human error models used, and by a verification of the corre-
spondence of the assumptions to the system which is analysed.
-9-
"HUMAN ERROR'1 - DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
The term "human error" is loaded and very ambiguous. Basically/
a human error is committed if the effect of human behaviour
exceeds a limit of acceptability. Of course, the classification
of a specific behaviour as an error depends as much upon the
limits of acceptability as it depends upon the behaviour it-
self. In practise, the limits are often defined after the fact,
by someone who can base his judgements on a careful, rational
evaluation of the function of the system, while the specific
behaviour possibly was a quick response in a stressed dynamic
situation. Therefore, as it has been argued by Rook (1965) and
Swain (1969), it is necessary to distinguish clearly between
errors induced by°inappropriate limits of acceptability; i.e.,
by the design of the work situation, and errors caused by
inappropriate human behaviour. Furthermore, as discussed by
Rigby (1969), errors can be classified as random errors, due
to random variability of human performance such as variations
in manual precision or force; differences in timing and simple
mistakes and slips of memory; as systematic errors which can be
caused by personal abnormalities or inappropriate system design;
and, finally, sporadic errors, occasional "faux pas" which are
infrequent and often unexplainable erroneous actions. From this
definition it follows that it is difficult to give general
characteristics of sporadic errors.
The influence from random errors largely depends upon the extent
to which the limits of acceptability can be arranged to span the
range of natural variability of performance of the people selec-
ted to the task, and the opportunity given the operator to
monitor his performance and correct the errors he commits.
Systematic errors can be related deterministically to specific
properties of the work situation and can be eliminated if the
causal relations can be identified and changed. It is a very
important category of errors within the context of monitoring
and supervisory task in automated systems where the operators
typically have to respond to changes in system operation by
corrective actions.
-10-
In the present general discussion, two types of systematic errors
which seem to be important should be considered: '
First, human responses to changes in a system will be system-
atically wrong if task demands exceed the limits of capability.
Demands and capability may conflict at several aspects of a
task such as time required, availability of state information,
background information on system functioning, complexity of data
processes, etc. The operator must b^'able to trade off demands
and limitations by choice of a proper strategy. An example would
be for the operator to remove time constraints by first bringing
the system to a safe, stationary state.
Secondly, systematic human errors may be caused by several kinds
of procedural traps. During normal worfc condition human oper-
ators are extremely efficient due to a very effective adaptation
to convenient, representative signs and signals. On the other
hand, these will very probably lead the man into difficulties
when the behaviour of the system changes. An operator will only
make conscious observations if his attention is alerted by an
interrupt from the subconscious processes. This means that he
will only deal with the environment consciously when his sub-
conscious, automated, or habitual responses no longer will
control the environment adequately. Likewise, he cannot be
expected to cope with a new unique change or event in the system
in the proper problem oriented way of thinking if the interrupt
is caused by information, which immediately associates to a
familiar task or action. It is very likely that familiar
associations based on representative, but insufficient infor-
mation will prevent the operator from realizing the need to
analyses a complex, unique situation. He may more readily accept
the improbable coincidence of several familiar faults in the
system rather than the need to investigate one new and complex
fault of low probability. In this way, the efficiency of man's
internal world model allows him to be selective and therefore
to cope effectively with complex systems in familiar situations>
and, at the same time, may lead him into traps which are easily
seen after the fact. Davis concludes from an analysis of traffic
accidents (Davis 1958):
-11-
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 It is usual for a person to have expectations, or to hold
to what may be called an hypothesis about every situation
he meets, even when information is notably incomplete. This
hypothesis, which is in some degree the product of his
previous experience of similar situations, governs the
way in which he perceives the situation and the way in
which he organizes the perceptual material available to him.
As he receives further information, his hypothesis tends to
be modified or amended or abandoned and replaced. Sometimes,
however, an hypothesis and the1'expectations which go with
it, appear to be unduly resistant to change.11
The importance of the different categories of errors depends
upon the task conditions. In repetitive tasks which are pre-
planned, errors due to demands exceeding resource limits and
errors due to procedural traps etc., will be of minor import-
ance since when experienced they are readily removed by redesign
of the task. Therefore, random errors related to human varia-
bility would typically be more prevalent. A review of errors
reported from instrument calibration and testing (Appendix 2)
indicates as typical errors omission of functionally isolated
acts, lack of consideration of secondary conditions, mistakes
of alternative possibilities etc.
On the other hand, systematic errors are significant contribu-
tors when operators have to respond to abnormal plant condition
during monitoring and supervisory tasks. Reviews indicate that
failure of human operators to identify abnormal states of a
plant or system plays an important role in accidents and inci-
dents in complex systems (Rasmussen 1969, Cornell 1968). How-
ever, even if the state of the system is correctly identified,
the operator may still be caught in a procedural trap. A fam-
iliar, stereotyped sequence of actions may be initiated from a
single conscious decision or association from the system state.
If the corresponding procedure takes some time; e.g., it is
necessary to move to another place to perform it, the mind may
return to other matters, and the subconscious actions will
become vulnerable to interference, particularly if part of the
sequence is identical to other heavily automated sequences.
-12-
Systematic human errors in unfamiliar tasks are typically caused
by interference from other more stereotyped situations and,
therefore^ the potential for systematic errors depends very
much upon the level of the operator's skill. The fact that
operators can control a system successfully during a com-
misioning and test period is no proof that operators will con-
tinue to do so during the plant lifetime.
A basic problem when dealing with systematic erroneous responses
to unfamiliar situation is the veryrlow probability of such
complex situations.
In a properly designed system there should be a reverse relation
between the probability of occurrence of an abnormal situation
and its potential effect in terms of losses and damage. In
modern large centralized systems, the consequences of faults
can be very serious and consequently the effect of human errors
in situations of extremely low probability must be considered.
In such cases, the potential for systematic errors cannot be
identified from experience, but only by a systematic functional
analysis of realistic scenarios modelling the relevant situ-
ations.
- 1 3 -
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RELIABILITY AND SAFETY ANALYSIS
i
In discussing the methodological problems of including the human
element of a system in a systematic risk analysis, it appears to
be practical to consider the problems related to reliability
analysis and safety analysis separately.
The terms, safety and reliability, are not too well defined. In
the following discussion^ they are used to characterize two
different aspects of the sensitivity to accidental maloperation
of a process plant.
Reliability is a measure of the ability of a system to maintain
the specified function. Classical reliability analysis leads to
figures describing the probability that a system will perform
the specified function during a given period or at a given time
(M.T.B.F., Availability etc.). Reliability analysis is related
to the effects caused by absence of specified function. In case
of a process plant reliability, figures are used to judge the
expected average loss of production; in case of a safety system
to judge the expected average loss of protection.
System safety is a measure of the risk or the expected average
losses, caused directly by the presence of a state of accidental
maloperation, in terms of human injuries, loss of equipment etc.
To judge the safety of a system, it is, therefore, necessary to
study the probability of specific courses of events initiated by
the primary fault, and to relate the probability to the effects
of the maloperation, i.e., judgement of system safety is based
upon an extensive accident analysis.
In the following discussion a very clearcut distinction between
the methods used for reliability and safety analyses is drawn,
and very simplistic descriptions of the methods are used. This
is tolerable since the purpose of the discussion is to reach
some general conclusions regarding the conditions which should
be met by a system in order to make a systematic risk analysis
possible.
- 1 5 -
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HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The definition of the reliability of a system or system com-
ponent is generally stated in terms of the probability of a
specified function versus time, such as: "Reliability is defined
as that characteristic of an item expressed by the probability
that it will perform its required function in the desired manner
under all relevant conditions and on the occasion or during the
time intervals when it is required &<5 to perform" (Green and
Bourne 1972) . •*'•
Reliability analysis is concerned with the departure from the
specified function of the plant and its parts and components.
"Specified function" is rather stable during plant operation and
is unambiguously related to the functional design intention.
Therefore, the basis of reliability analysis is generally well
established. The basic method of reliability analysis is to
decompose a complex system into parts or components, to a level
at which component properties are recognized from widespread
use, so that empirical fault data can be collected, in principle,
this break-down must be carried through to a level where com-
ponent function is invariate with application. This is possible
for many standard components, which are designed for a specific
function and used according to specifications in system design,
e.g., resistors, pumps. In some cases, however, alternative
"specified functions" are possible at the level of break-down
at which data collection can be arranged. For example, in
practice relays and valves can serve tö close or break a cir-
cuit. Fault data must then be classified according to the
function performed, as the related probabilities of failure may
be very different for different functions.
Overall reliability characteristics of the system are derived
by means of models representing the relations between component
and system failures. The degree of sophistication of the prob-
abilistic system models used to derive reliability figures
characterizing the total system depend upon the quality of the
component fault data available. If only bulk data on component
failure rates are available, as is typically the case for pro-
cess plant components, simple probabilistic models are used
-17-
which represent system structure only as far as to specify
whether components functionally are connected in series or
parallel during specified system function (reliability block
diagrams). If more detailed descriptions of failure mechanisms
are available, and if good data are available for failure and
repair rates, then much more complete failure modelling becomes
worthwhile.
In the methods of human reliabilityprediction in practical use
(Meister 1971, Swain 1973), this technique has been transferred
to human performance. The complex and often very system-specific
human functions are broken down into typical, recurrent, and
elementary functions for which reliability data can be collected,
Such elementary functions are in practice only distinguishable
by their external effects, and are therefore generally characte-
rized as "subtasks".
This technique must, however, be used with caution, since the
human element within a technical system has properties which
cause difficulties with respect to the basic aspects of re-
liability analysis:
Man is an adaptive and learning system element, and may very
probably respecify a function or a task. Consider for example
a monitoring task from a power plant. The specified task: "If
the frequency meter indicates below 58 C/S, disconnect load to
save the generator11. If an operator has only met readings below
58 C/S due to poor meter performance, he may very reasonably
respecify his task: "If ...... then calibrate meter" - and lose
a generator (as happened at one stage in the US power black out
in 1965). Unless such respecifications are known, reliability
prediction will be systematically wrong.
Furthermore, a human operator is a multipurpose element. He may
be occupied by another task, and omission of specified function
may be due to other events in the system rather than human
failure mechanisms.
Man is in many respects a holistic data processor responding to
total situations rather than to individual events or system
-18-
THERP - Techniques for Human Error Rate Prediction
The steps in THERP are similar to the steps in conventional reliability
analysis if human activities are substituted for equipment outputs:
1. Define system failure(s). These are the events for which the influence
of human errors is to be estimated.
Z. List and analyze the related human operations. This step is the task
analysis described in the previous section.
i'
3. Estimate (predict) related error rates (or substitute estimates of error-
likeliness).
U. Determine estimated effects of human errors on the system failure events
of interest. Thiseeffort usually involves integration of the human
reliability analysis with a system reliability analysis.
5. Recommend changes to system and calculate new system failure rates.
This statement shows the tie-in of the model with MMSA and its use
as a tool in human engineering design efforts.
B
a • probability of successful performance of subtask A
A a probability of unsuccessful performance of subtask A
b * probability of successful performance of subtask B
B • probability of unsuccessful performance of subtask B
S » probability of task success * ab
F » probability of task failure » 1 - ab = aB + Ab + AB
Example 1 - Simple Production Task by One Worker: Assume that a production
worker is putting finishing touches on an electronic assembly. Consider that
his task on a production line is made up of two subtasks, A and B:
Subtask A* Connect two cables which can be reversed,
Subtask B. Plug in two tubes which can be reversed.
Other errors are possible, but for the purpose of simplicity only the two
reversal errors listed above are considered.
Fig. 1. Simplified illustration of the structure of THERP from
Sandia Lab. Reproduced from Swain (1976).
-19-
states. Complex functions may be performed by skilled operators
as one integrated and (automated response. In this case fault
data can1only be obtained by a realistic simulation of the total
function (Regulinski 1973). Break-down of complex functions is
only acceptable if the performance is paced by the system, i.e.,
cues from the system serve to initiate elementary skilled sub-
routines individually and to control their sequence. This is the
case in many manual tasks, e.g., mechanical assembly tasks, but
can probably also be arranged by mo£é complex mental tasks by
properly designed interface systems*:
The failure properties of a specific function depend upon the
operating conditions, and for technical components weighting
functions are generally used to modify fault data according to
load and environmental effects. The great variability of human
performance makes a similar weighting of fault data by "per-
formance shaping factors11 mandatory (Swain 1973), but the appli-
cation is difficult as "operating conditions", such as motiv-
ation, stress, fatigue, etc., are badly defined and difficult
to quantify; "expert judgements" are generally the only method
available.
New problems arise if several internal mechanisms with very
different failure probabilities can serve the same external
component function. The more flexible a component is, the more
difficult will these problems be, especially if the internal
organization has autonomous features such as optimization,
adaptation, learning. These are the prominent features of the
human elements in a system. The internal function used to per-
form a specific external task by a man depends strongly upon
his training and skill, his prior experiences of system behav-
iour, his subjective performance criteria etc. Failure data
collected from a system in which an operator meets a specific
task frequently, and performs it by a sensory-motor response
based on a one-step direct association, will have no relation
to the failure probability in a system where the demand for the
task is infrequent, e.g., as part of an emergency action. The
response must then be performed by a sequence of cognitive func-
tions. The resulting problem can only be solved by classifying
fault data according to the internal functions used to perform
-20-
a task. In this situation, weighting of fault data collected
from standard, frequently initiated tasks, by means of "per-
formance' shaping factors11 is not acceptable. At present, this
means that human reliability prediction is only feasible, if
"specified function" of human operators is synonymous with a
familiar task performed by a skill maintained through frequent
use or exercise.
A human trait having great influenc^/upon the reliability of
human performance is the ability ofVselfmonitorinq and error
correction. The mechanism of error detection depends upon the
task situation and the intention of the operator. If the inten-
tion is to perform a given sequence of actions, as will be the
case in most familiar and stereotyped tasks, error detection
will typically be due to difficulties iYi the sequence caused by
errors in the preceding steps. It is obvious that this kind of
error detection has drastic effects on reliability. The prob-
ability of selecting the wrong key in your key-ring is high;
however, the probability that you should not succeed in entering
your house of this reason is nil.
In more open and flexible situations, the human intentions will
typically be related to attainment of a specific goal, and the
reliability in reaching the goal will be related to the per-
sistence in the intention and the care with which a discrepancy
is observed or detected, rather than error probability during
the striving towards the goal. If you intend to spend a comfort-
able night reading a good book, the probability of success is
not related to the error rate in operating the lamp switch nor
to the reliability of the power system, but rather to the prob-
ability of having a supply of candles and matches or the prox-
imity of a good restaurant.
Clearly, the error correction features of a task depend upon
the structure of the sequence, and not on the individual steps.
The potential for error correction influences the reliability
of the task drastically and determines which parts of the task
should be considered in detail as well as the data needed in an
analysis.
-21-
TYPICAL TASK STRUCTURES
Stereotyped Sequence
Cues I
4
• step
Error detection
Simple sequence of steps cued by environment e.g. production
and assembling tasks. Error detection typically when subse-
quent action turns out more difficult. Overall error rate
based on error rates of steps must be corrected.
Sequence of goal-oriented steps
Subgoal state
Correct Error detection,
I mismatch
Mismatch
•r detection
"Subtask1
Goal-oriented performance facilitates error detection at
subgoal nodes - if errors can be corrected by iteration,
feed-back effects determine error rates. Overall error rate
depends on reliability of error detection. Break-down to
elements for data collection only to "subtask" level.
Fig. 2. Simplified illustration of typical task structures
-22-
Monitoring and error correction act as a feed back loop around
the task performance, (and the overall quality of the performance
will - as in any feed back system - depend on the quality of the
error detection and correction functions/ rather than upon the
quality of the basic performance itself. In addition to the use
of this feed-back feature to improve the reliability of a task
design, a proper design of the error detection and correction
function can be used as the means for making a reliability
analysis of the total task practical; since the lower limit of
the overall reliability will be determined by the reliability
of the monitoring function alone. This may be the only way to
assess the reliability of poorly structured complex human per-
formance - e.g. in response to unfamiliar situations. It should
also be noted that the influence of error correction features
of a task will lead to a strong dependence of the error rates
collected for human actions upon the context from which they
are collected.
To sum up, systematic analysis and quantification of system re-
liability is not feasible unless the design of the system and
the work situation of its operators satisfy some general con-
ditions. Necessary conditions for the use of probabilistic
methods to predict the probability that a specified task is
performed satisfactorily by human operators are:
- there is no significant contribution from systematic errors
due to redefinition of task, interference from other tasks
or activities, etc.;
and
- the task can be broken down to a sequence of independent sub-
tasks at a level where failure data can be obtained from
similar work situations;
and
- these independent subtasks are cued individually by the system
or by other external means, so that modification of procedure
does not take place;
- if these conditions are not satisfied, e.g., because the task
is performed as one integrated whole, or it is performed by
complex and variable human functions such as higher level
cognitive functions, then the effect of the task must be
- 2 3 -
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OPERATOR ERROR RATE ESTIMATE
Activity
Selection of a key-operated switch gather than a non-key switch (this
value does not include the error o£ decision where the operator misin-
terprets situation and believes Key switch is correct choice).
Selection of a switch (or pair of switches) dissimilar in shape or
location to the desired sviten (or pair of switches), assuming no
decision error. For example, operator actuates large handled switch
rather than small switch.
General human error of commission, e.g., misreading label and therefore
selecting wrong switch.
General human error of omission where there is no display in the
control room of the status of the item omitted, e.g., failure to
return manually operated test valve to vpr°Per configuration after
maintenance.
Errors of omission, where the items being omitted are embedded in a
procedure rather than at the end as above.
Simple arithmetic errors with self-checkinq but without repeating
the calculation by re-doing it on another piece of paper.
Given that an operator is reaching for an incorrect switch (or pair of
switches), he selects a particular similar appearing switch (or pair
of switches), where x = the number of incorrect switches (or pair of
switches) adjacent to the desired switch (or pair of switches). The
1/x applies up to 5 or 6 items. After that point the error rate would
be lower because the operator would take more time to search. With up
to 5 or 6 items he doesn't expect to be wrong and therefore is more
likely to do less deliberate searching.
Given that an operator is reaching for a wrong motor operated valve MOV
switch (or pair of switches), he fails to note from the indicator
lamps that the HOV(s) is (are) already in the desired state and merely
changes the status of the MOV(s) without recognizing he had selected
the wrong switch(es).
Same as above, except that the state (s) of the incorrect switch(es) is
(are) not the desired state.
If an operator fails to operate correctly one of two closely coupled
valves or switches in a procedural step» he also fails to correctly
operate the other valve.
Monitor or inspector fails to recognize initial error by operator.
Mote: With continuing feedback of the error on the annunciator panel«
this high error rate would not apply.
Personnel on different work shift fail to check condition of hardware
unless required by check list or written directive.
Monitor fails to detect undesired position of valves, etc.« during
qeneral walk-around inspections« assuming no check list is used.
General error rate given very hiqh stress levels where dangerous
activities are occurring rapidly.
Error estimates, reproduced from WASH 1400.
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reversible and subject to an error detection and correction
function, which in tturn satisfies the above-mentioned con-
ditions for predictability.
In this discussion it has been assumed that empirical data on
human error rates in industrial process plants are available.
Unfortunately, such data are very scarce. Most of the data dis-
cussed in the litteraturen seem to be derived from the original
work done at the AmericancInstitute ot Research (Payne et al,,
1962, Munger et al., 1962) or to be Very general estimates.
Systematic data collection in industrial plants has not been
reported apart from the Licensee Event Reports published by US-
NRC (see Appendix Z)• Error rates are difficult to derive from
these reports because the denominators, the number of error op-
portunities, are not known. An attempt to estimate the denomi-
nators to be used with the Licensee Event Reports has been made
by Fullwood et al., 1976.
The data problem becomes even worse, when the reliability of
redundant protective systems must be predicted. In this case, the
human contribution to overall system unreliability may be due to
infrequent errors which are repeated in more channels, i.e. to
peculiar systematic errors rather than to random errors from
normal human variability.
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HUMAN FACTORS PROBLEMS IN SAFETY ANALYSIS
System safety is a measure of the risk - the expected average
loss - related to direct effects of the transitions from speci-
fied function into a state of accidental maloperation, in terms
of human injuries or damage to equipment or environment.
System safety has to be judged from an extensive accident
analysis. To identify the course of^events following the in-
itiating fault, and to determine the ultimate effect, and its
probability, it is necessary to use a detailed functional de-
scription of the system including functional properties both
within and outside the normal operating regimes of the plant.
Different systematic techniques have been developed for this
purpose, based on fault tree analysis (Tussel 1973, Powers 1973)
and cause-consequence analysis (Nielsen 1971, Taylor 1977).
To evaluate the effects of accidental maloperation, statistical
data differentiating the different modes of failure of the
components must be available. Furthermore, severe effects
are generally results of courses of events of extremely low
probability, and may be related to component modes of failure
which are a priori improbable and insignificant contributors
to component bulk data.
In the analysis of accidents, the human element is the imp of
the system. The human reliability, i.e., the probability that
operators perform the "specified functions" is of course an
important factor in system safety, e.g. when operators are
assigned special monitoring and protective functions. In safety
analysis, however, a more difficult problem is the analysis of
the effect of specific, erroneous human acts. The variability
and flexibility of human performance together with human inven-
tiveness make it practically impossible to predict the effects
of an operator's actions when he makes errors, and it is im-
possible to predict his reaction in a sequence of accidental
events, as he very probably misinterprets an unfamiliar situ-
ation. Some illustrating case stories are found in Appendix 1.
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These cases indicate that search strategies used to identify
accidental chains of qvents in the technical system will not be
adequate to identify the human potential for creating hazard-
ous situations. In general, search strategies related to fault
tree analysis and cause-consequence analysis are sufficient to
identify the effects on one part of a system from errors which an
operator commits during work on that part due to mistakes etc.
However, contrary to reliability analysis, a safety analysis
cannot solely be based on search strategies which use the
specified task as a guide or structure. Effective search strat-
egies have to take into account the fact that operators are
multipurpose components moving freely around in the system. Rare/
but risky events in one part of the system can be caused by
erroneous acts by operators working on quite different parts of
the system; such as disconnection of cables to facilitate vacuum
cleaning; interference from manipulation of electric welding
gear; short circuits from dropped tools. These types of errors
must be found by a search guided by a topographical proximity
criterion - analysis of all activity close to the part of the
system in question. Furthermore, psychological proximity should
be considered. It happens that features of an unfamiliar situ-
ation demanding a special procedure instead release an auto-
mated routine belonging to other task conditions, especially
if parts of the two task sequences psychologically speaking are.
very similar. Examples are given in the case stories in Appendix
1.
However, a heuristic search based on these criteria may not be
sufficient to identify the potential for high consequence, low
probability situations which typically are related to complex
situations caused by several coincident abnormal conditions and
events» A heuristic strategy to identify such situations re-
sembles a design algorithm: First, potential for accidents such
as high energy accumulations, toxic material concentrations etc.
are identified together with potential.targets for accidental
release such as people, environment etc. Then possible accidents
are deigned, i.e., the technical (mal)functions and human
actions which are necessary to form the route from source to
target are determined. Finally, it is determined how changes
in the normal system together with coincident normal and ab-
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TYPICAL STRUCTURES OF ANALYSIS
Rel iab i l i ty Analysis
Task sequence
Structure of analysis based on s t ructure of task (compare
with THERP).
Safety Analysis „
Critical eventTask A
Tech. faults
Task B
Error
Extran. hum
acts
Accidental chain of events
Structure of analysis based on accidental chains of events;
analysis and search across tasks ; search for sources to
c r i t i c a l events (compare with cause-consequence ana lys i s ) .
Sneak Path Analysis
Starting event
change
Several disturbed and
normal human activities
and technical functions
timed for sneak-path
Error
Accident; potential released
Structure of analysis based on morphological search for
routes from accident potential to target. "Design11 accident
and search for necessary changes (compare with MORT).
Fig. 4. Simplified illustration of typical structures of
analysis.
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CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
1
CCC for
critical event
.n process syslen
Fig. 5. The structure of a cause-consequence chart for a criti-
cal event in a process system. From Nielsen (1974) .
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CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Assume that this necessary information is available. Assume
further that a dynamic model of the plant is available at least
at the intuitive level. Some of the main steps in cause-conse-
queace analysis are then:
1. Select a critical event. A critical event is an unintended
function of a component directly controlling or affecting
main energy or mass balances.
2. Modify the dynamic model taking the critical event into
account.
3. Specify the changes/transients of the main process parameters
at locations where there are protective devices.
4. Are loading limits for relevant process components exceeded
by effects?
5. Identify the environmental changes within relevant areas.
6. Identify "designed protective actions11.
7. Construct a consequence chart which shows the potential
combinations of ''released11 and "not released" designed
protective actions.
8. For each combination identified in item 7 modify the dynamic
model.
9. For each of the identified potential accidents specify the
changes/transients of main process parameters.
LO. Are loading limits for relevant process components exceeded?
11. Continue the consequence search, if relevant, otherwise go
to item 12.
12. Ar€5 significant consequences identified? If so, then proceed
to item 13, otherwise go to item 1.
13. Identify the potential causes of the critical event.
14. Determine whether accident-preventing or -limiting actions
a r e
 capable of coping with the critical event.
15. Redesign, if necessary.
Fig. 6. Steps in development of cause-consequence diagrams.
Simplified from Nielsen (1974) .
- 3 0 -
" i
MÖRT - Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis
1» A n unwanted transfer of energy,
\ ' •
2. Because of lack of barriers and/or controls,
3« Producing Injury to persons, property or process,
4« Preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors, which*
a. Failed to adjust to changes in physical or human factors,
b. And produced unsafe conditions and/or unsafe acts,
5t Arising out of the risk in an activity,
6. And interrupting or degrading the activity.
Fig. 7. The accident d e f i n i t i o n which in MORT i s used to
structure a morphological search for event chains
leading to acc idents . From Johnson (1973).
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normal human activities will meet the designed accident pattern.
Such accidents are sometimes due to "sneak paths" which are
formed by.minor mishaps or malfunctions in simultaneous human
activities which only become risky in case of very specific
combinations and timing.
In practice therefore, human variability makes a quantitative
safety analysis unrealistic, unless the system design satisfies
a number of conditions. • •/
\ ' •
Like other problems in system design caused by component per-
formance variability, the problems in accident analysis can be
circumvented if feed back functions are introduced, i.e., if
feed back links are introduced in accidental courses of events
by means of monitoring and correction functions, as it has also
been discussed in the previous section.
Major losses or human injuries caused by accidental maloperation
are typically related to uncontrolled release of stored energy
in the system. Apart from accidents caused by spontaneous frac-
tures of energy barriers and explosions, accidents are typically
the effects of disturbances of mass or energy balances. There
is, therefore, a time delay between the primary cause and the
release due to the integrating effect of a disturbed balance.
This time delay makes correcting actions possible.
Furthermore, critical variables related to the energy level of
the balance can be found which can indicate potentially risky
maloperation irrespectively of the preceding course of events.
If a safe state of the system can be defined, and it can be
reached through the action of a monitoring and protection func-
tion which does not in itself introduce potential risks, an
upper bound of the probability ,o,f a large class of event se-
quences leading to the effect which is monitored can be found
by a reliability analysis of the protecting function. Such
protective functions can be performed by human operators if the
task is designed so as to be accessible to human operator re-
liability analysis, or can be performed by automatic safety
systems.
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A properly designed protective function enables the derivation
of the probability figures needed in accident analysis by means
of a reliability analysis of the protective function. Together
with data on the frequency of error opportunities, this analysis
leads directly to upper bounds on probability of courses of
events leading to the effect which is monitored.
It is the extensive use of automatic, protective systems in
nuclear power plants that has made it possible to perform a
quantitative analysis - including human performance - of the
safety level of such installations (Norman Rasmussen et al.
1975).
The difficulty to get the empirical data from real life situ-
ations needed to predict the probability of specific erroneous
human acts which are possible contributors to rare chains of
events leading to accidents, results in the following conditions
for quantification of system safety:
The probability of specific consequences of accidental events
in a system can only be quantified if:
- it can be demonstrated that the effect of erroneous human
acts are not significant contributors to the probability; if
necessary by introduction of interlocks or barriers which
prevent human interaction;
or
- the effects of erroneous human acts are reversible and de-
tectable by a monitoring or safety function which can be
performed by operators or automatically.
If the reliability of such barriers and safety functions can be
quantified then an upper bound of the probability of the event
in question can be derived from the frequency of error oppor-
tunities .
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CONCLUSION
In principle, a process plant design, which is not based on
extensive experience from similar concepts, is only acceptable
if perfprmance design targets can be verified by systematic
analysis including a quantitative reliability and safety analy-
sis.
A quantitative safety analysis is orvly possible if the plant
design is performed according to guidelines derived from the
limitations of the available methods.
The design must be based upon a qualitative accident analysis.
Accident potentials cannot be identified by an evaluation of the
effects of all possible courses of accidental events. They must
be identified directly by a systematic search. Heuristic search
strategies related to energy and poisonous matter concentrations
have been developed to serve this purpose (Johnson 1973, Powers
1973) .
When accident potentials are identified in this way, the se-
quences of accidental events, which are capable of triggering
an accident, must be identified by a systematic, qualitative
cause-consequence or fault tree analysis. If a quantitative
probabilistic evaluation of the sequences so identified indi-
cates unacceptable risk - or if a quantitative analysis is not
possible due to lack of statistical data, monitoring and pro-
tection functions must be introduced in the design.
Such functions must be designed so as to be accessible to a
quantitative reliability analysis. During the reliability analy-
sis of complex protective systems, it is generally important to
keep track of the temporal relations of events, and simple re-
liability block diagram analysis must be replaced by more
sophisticated methods, such as Markov models, renewal theory
etc., compatible with an analysis of causal chains of events.
A protective function can be performed by an automatic system
or a human operator.
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Reliability analysis of human performance is only feasible if
the tasks are performed by sequences of skilled subroutines
which are separated and initiated by proper cues from the
system. The reliability of more complex and freerunning tasks
cannot be predicted directly; an acceptable prediction of re-
sults can only be made in this situation if the effects of the
actions are reversible and subject to verification by an oper-
ator, following a predictable check procedure, or covered by an
automatic protective function. /
Automation in this way does not remove man from a system, neither
does it force him into the role of a trained robot. Automation
serves to replace unexpected tasks at unpredictable moments by
tasks which can be planned and trained and which can be based
upon qualified decisions, such as supervision, test, and main-
tenance.
A proper design policy will decrease the influence of unpre-
dictable performance shaping factors, such as stress and motiv-
ation. When introducing automatic safety systems, the designer
takes responsibility of plant safety and thus relieves the oper-
ator from stress. The actions of safety systems are related to
rather general criteria concerning the initiating plant states
and complex, safe protective systems will decrease plant relia-
bility. The operator thus has a supervisory task to protect
the plant from unnecessary automatic safety actions. The re-
sponsibility of the operators is related to the reliability of
plant operation.
The motivation of plant operators can be maintained in automatic
systems if they are allowed to use their abilities and take
responsibility in the tasks they are allocated. There is no
reason not to permit this as long as the system is designed in ;
a way which allows them to verify the effects of their decisions
and actions in a predictable way.
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CASE STORIES
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CASE STORIES
The following case stories illustrate some
of the phenomena which make reliability and
safety prediction difficult. Unless otherwise
indicated, they have been obtained from private
communications with process plant operators. In
some cases, details have been delete^* to pro-
tect both the innocent, £<nd the unlircky.
Case:
During normal, operation of a process plant
the power supply to the instrumentation and the
control console slowly disappears.
Investigation:
The manual main circuit breaker in the fly-
wheel motor-generator supply is found to be in
the off position. The conclusion of an investi-
gation was that a roving operator, checking cooling
towers and pumps, inadvertently had switched
from a routine check round to the friday afternoon
shut down check round and turned off the supply.
The routes of the two check rounds are the same,
except that he is supposed to pass by the door of
the generator room on the routine check, but to
enter and turn off the supply on the shut down
check. Something "en route11 obviously has con-
ditioned him for shut down check (sunshine and
day dreams?). The operator was not aware of his
action, but did not reject the condition.
Comments:
Human operators move around in the plant, and
it can be difficult to predict where in the causal
structure of the plant he interferes. His actions
may not be initiated by an event in the system or
specified by a program, but by subconscious
mechanisms, i.e. it is difficult to predict when
he interferes and how.
Case:
During start up of a process plant the plant
is automatically shut down during manual adjustment
of a cooling system.
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Investigation:
During start up the operator monitored the
temperature of the primary cooling system and
controlled it by switching off and on the sec-
ondary cooling pumps to avoid water condensation
in the primary system due to the cold cooling
water. On this occasion he observed the tempera-
ture to reach below the low limit, signalling a
demand to switch off the secondary pumps, while
he was talking to cooperator over the phone. He
then switched off the primary pumps ^ acnd the plant
immediately shut down automatically« He did not
recognize the cause immediately, but had to
diagnose the situation from the warning signals.
The control keys for the two sets of pumps
%are positioned far apart on the console. A special
routine exists during which the operator switches
the primary pumps on and off to allow an operator
in the basement to adjust pump valves after pump
overhaul while they communicate by phone. Is the
cause of the event subconscious switching of
procedures due to the phone call?
Comment;
The case illustrates some features of operator
behaviour:
- Change in procedures by secondary unpredic-
table events or conditions.
- The operator introduces couplings in the system
by coincident omission of one task and performance
of an inappropriate action.
- The risk may be related to the inappropriate
and unpredictable act rather than to the omission.
Case:
An experimental plant shuts down automatically
during normal operation due to inadvertent manual
operation of cooling system shut off valve.
Investigation:
A safety shut off valve in the cooling system
which is routinely closed during post shut down
check procedures was closed manually. The valve
control switch is placed behind the operating con-
sole, and so is the switch of a flood lightning
system used for special operations monitored through
closed circuit television. The switches are neither
similar not closely positioned. The operator has to
pass the valve switch on his way to the flood light
switch.
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In this case the^operator went behind the
console to switch off the flood light/ but
operated the shut off valves which caused plant
shut down through the interlock system.
Comments;
Strongly automated and stereotyped action
sequences are frequently initiated by a single
conscious decision. If the action takes some time,
e.g., you have to move to another place to perform
the action, the mind may return to atfher matters,
and the sequence is vulnerable to unpredictable
conditions, particularly if the sequence intended
in some of the steps overlap other familiar and
automated sequences.
Case:
Butadiene explosion at Texas City/
Plant Safety and Loss Prevention. Volume 5, CEP.
Investigation:
"Loss of butadiene from the system through
the leaking overhead line motor valve resulted in
substantial changes in tray composition ...M.
..."The loss of liquid in the base of the column
uncovered the calandria tubes, allowing the tube
wall temperature to approach the temperature of
the heat supply. The increased vinylacetylene
concentration and high tube wall temperature set
the stage for the explosion which followed".
..."The make flow meter showed a continuous flow;
however, the operator assumed that the meter was
off calibration since the make motor valve was
closed and the tracing on the chart was a straight
line near the base of the chart. The column base
level indicator showed a low level in the base of
the column, but ample kettle vapor was being
generated".
Comment:
Wisdom after the event tells that closed valve
together with continuous flow signals possible
leak, and the risk implied calls, for investigation.
The skilled operator, however, conforms his obser-
vations individually with his expectations or
process feel. If abnormal observation refers to
a familiar situation, he sees no problem and does
not investigate the matter. You cannot predict
his response without knowing his daily experiences.
It can be difficult to predict the probability
that an operator performs a specified function
because he may have respecified his function -
sometimes with good reason.
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This can happen, even if there is a clear
prewarning: !
Case:
Melt down of fuel element in nuclear reactor.
Nuclear Safety, September 1962.
Investigation:
Certain tests required several hundred pro-
cess coolant tubes to be blocked by jfeoprene
disks. 7 disks were left''in the system after the
test, but were located by a test of the gauge
system that monitors water pressure on each indi-
vidual process tube. For some reason the gauge on
,one tube was overlooked, and it did not appear
in a list of abnormal gauge readings prepared
during the test. There was an additional oppor-
tunity to spot the blocked tube when a later test
was performed on the system. This time the pressure
for the tube definitely indicated a blocked tube.
The shift supervisor failed, however, to recognize
this indication of trouble. The gauge was adjusted
at that time by an instrument mechanic to give a
midscale reading which for that particular tube
was false. This adjustment made it virtually
certain that the no flow condition would exist
until serious damage resulted.
Case:
Docket 50219-167 2 Two diesel generators set
out of service simultaneously.
Event sequence:
8.10 permission to perform surveillance test
on containment spray system No. 1 including
electrical and mechanical inspection of diesel
generator No. 1.
8.20 permission to take diesel No. 2 out of
service for oil addition.
Both systems out of service for 45 min. Fore-
man overlooked test of No. 1 system when permitting
diesel No. 2 operation.
Comment:
Coincident unavailability of redundant
systems caused by improper timing of routine
tasks. Difficult to predict due to dependence on
station "software" vulnerable for changes and
oversight due to absence of cues from the system
supporting attention.

-43-
S
i'
APPENDIX 2
REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT
REPORTS ON
CALIBRATION, SETTING AND TESTING
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INTRODUCTION
The following reflections on human errors are based on a review
of "Licencee Event Reports" as they are edited and compiled by
X )
"Nuclear Power Experience1 . The reports reviewed are from the
January 1978 state of the collection and include those in the
category of operator/technician errors: calibration, setting
and testing.
In general, reliable statistical information on humai\ error
rates related to different types of human errors is difficult
to gather from this kind of event reporting. While the denomi-
nator« problem of obtaining the actual frequency of error oppor-
tunities can be solved in principle, the reports do not actually
give information on the total frequency of errors committed, but
rather the frequency of errors which are not immediately corrected
by the operator himself. This means that the frequencies of dif-
ferent categories of errors found in the reports are heavily
biased by the actual demands of the task. Clearly, human errors
which lead to latent system faults or to effects which are not
reversible by immediate counteraction will typically find their
way to the reports.
x)
Nuclear Power Experience. Edited by Nuclear Power Experience
Inc., P.O. Box 544, Encino, California
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THE TASK: CALIBRATION, SETTING AND TESTING
To judge the effect of error recovery and to relate the errors
found in the reports to task content in general, a description
of the task in rather general terms is useful.
Generally the task of calibration is a well defined, pro-
ceduralized task. The system states,, goals and procedures
implied in the task are''familiar tq, the operator and subject to
formal instruction and training. The errors to be expected are
typically omission of steps in the procedure and faults/mistakes
related to rather detailed acts. Problems related to conflicts
of goals and misinterpretation of system states , which are typi-
cal of responses to unfamiliar situations, are of minor import-
ance in the present context.
The task of calibration consists of subtasks of different con-
tent, and a preliminary review of the case stories indicates
that the following phases should be treated separately:
1. Establishment of the test circuit. The component or subsystem
to be tested is isolated from the plant and connected to the
test equipment.
2. The calibration act. The test equipment and/or the subsystem
to be tested is manipulated or adjusted according to a specified
procedure, and the response is compared/judged according to the
specified standard in order to obtain agreement.
3. Restoration of normal operating condition of the system. The
test equipment is removed, and the normal "line-up11 of valves
and switches in the system is restored.
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THE ERRORS: TYPICAL GLASSES
A preliminary review of the reports indicated the following
crude classification:
Omission of subtask or act
- Functionally isolated acts.
- Administrative acts e.g. logging,* reporting.
- Other (e.g. caused by distraction, preoccupation).
Errors in commission of subtask
- Improvisation with insufficient knowledge.
- Secondary conditions overlooked, not considered.
- Misinterpretation of instruction or message.
- Faults and mistakes.
- Manual variability, "clumsiness".
Extraneous acts (i.e. acts affecting other systems)
~ Inadequate spatial orientation.
- Manual variability, "clumsiness".
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ANALYSISj OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Excluding errors committed during plant commissioning, the
review includes 111 cases of operator/technician errors during
calibrating, setting and test. No attempt has been made to
extract statistically reliable data. Instead, the data have
been used to support deductive derivations of error character-
istics from the features of the task. See Tables 1 and 2.
The principal observation is the high contribution from omissions
of steps in the procedure. It should be noted that nearly all
these steps are functionally unrelated to the calibration it-
self and include such things as return^ of switches or valves
to operating position after test? check of standby channels
before disconnecting a channel for test? or purely administrat-
ive steps (Table 1). It should also be noted that most of the
omitted steps are found in the last phase of the task. One
explanation of the large contribution from such omissions could
be that the effect of these omissions is not directly apparent
which therefore prevents any immediate recovery. However, this
may not be the only cause. The fact that the steps omitted are
unrelated to the prime goal of the task - the calibration - may
in itself lead to a high probability of omission. In an anal-
ogous context, Whorf in analysing causes of industrial fires
observes that "the name of a situation affects behaviour" - which
can lead to similar effects. It is aléo noteworthy that this
type of error to some extent is repeated in several redundant
channels (see Table 2) .
Another significant class of errors are "faults and mistakes"
which mainly include two types: One is mistakes such as replace-
ment of sample size with that of another task? use of positive
correction factor instead of negative? calibration with increas-
ing pressure instead of decreasing, etc. Another type is the
faults concerned with incorrect or inaccurate set points. This
class of error is most significant within the calibration act
itself, which is the only part of the task subject to quanti-
tative specifications and which may lead to mistakes without
immediate detectable functional effects. Broadly speaking, we
*> p.t.o.
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here have two relate^ kinds of error: Variability and inaccu-
racy in a quantitatively specified adjustment and mistaken
interchange of two or more possibilities.
During the first phase of the task, the establishment of the
test circuit, the different types of errors all contribute/ This
might be expected a priori/ since this phase gives the operator
most freedom for action, and there v^ ill be large differences in
task conditions between(<different 1~ypes of circuits or components
to be tested or calibrated. Again the largest group is omission
of functionally isolated - including administrative - acts.
Extraneous acts are found only in this phase, and two types are
noted - effects on other systems can be caused by inappropriate
spatial orientation such as misplacement of jumpers# or by
simple "clumsiness".
One type of error affecting all three phases is due to change
of procedures in a way that secondary features affect the
calibration, i.e. influence of properties of the system which
are not effective or obvious when the prescribed procedure is
used. They may have the character of procedure "improvements":
Adding recorders (which load signal sources)j too rapid adjust-
ments (not considering time constants)j use of another available
size of filter paper (which changes calibration) etc. This kind
of error has some similarity to "omission of functionally
isolated acts".
Whorf, Benjamin Lee; The Relation of Habitual Thought and
Behaviour to Language. In: Language, Thought and Reality.
Selected Writings of Whorf. Ed. John B. Carroll; MIT Press,
1956).
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PREDICTION OF HUMAN ERROR RATES IN CALIBRATION
Some considerations on predictability can be made at a rather
general level, without reference to the particulars of the task.
In the quest for acceptable safety systems, an important contri-
bution to risk analysis will be an estimation of availability of
protection. In the present context, ••'the problem then is predic-
tion of human reliability, i.e. the1'probability that test and
calibration leave the system in the specified state. The obser-
vations from the event reports can be related to the conditions
for analysabilitycof a task for this purpose. These conditions
have previously been formulated as follows:
Necessary conditions for the use of probabilistic methods to
predict the probability that a specified task is performed
satisfactorily are:
1) a. There is no significant contribution from systematic errors
due to redefinition of task, interference from other tasks
or activities, etc.
and
b. The task can be broken down to a sequence of independent
subtasks at a level where failure data can be obtained from
similar work situations.
and
c. The subtasks are cued individually by the system or by
other external means, so that modification of procedure
does not take place.
or
2) If task cannot be broken down to independent subtasks, but
is performed as one integrated whole or it is based on
higher cognitive functions, then the effect of the task
must be reversible and surveyed by a predictable monitoring,
testing or inspecting function. Reliability analysis of
this test function can lead to estimates of limit values
of reliability of the task sequence.
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Th e following commentp can be made:
la: Systematic errors play a minor role in the cases considered.
They are only present in a few cases as "improvements" of
procedures• In general, they can be controlled by proper
design of equipment and procedures.
lb: The task of calibration can be broken down into rather inde-
pendent subtasks which are frequently performed and for which
empirical fault data therefore can be collected.
Error rates of the following categories of error are rel-
evant :
- Omission of acts which are functionally isolated from the
overall goal of the task sequence to which they are
connected.
- Using the wrong alternative of two possible, when the
choice has no functional effect upon the subsequent steps.
- Spread in accuracy when adjusting variables to reference
values.
- Operational "improvement" of procedures excluding consider-
ation of secondary conditions of no immediate influence
upon the task.
(For the cases reviewed, consideration only of "omission of
isolated act" during restoration and "faults and mistakes"
during the calibrating act could bring a prediction within
a factor of 2 from the target, see Table 1).
lc; In case of calibration and testing, control of the sequence
of the subtasks can be obtained through functional con-
straints provided by proper design of equipment.
There is no indication in the cases reviewed that extraneous
acts committed during work on other systems or during other
activities play any role in the availability of the systems. In
some cases miscalibration or defeat of system function is
explained in the event report by such extraneous, inadvertent
acts, but the number is insignificant.
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In conclusion# the features of the task of test and calibration
are such* that reliability of the task, seen in isolation, can be
made predictable by proper design of equipment and procedures.
Special problems are found in redundant safety systems in
attempting to predict the probability of repetition of errors
in subsequent calibration tasks. The cases reviewed indicate
that- repetition of "omission of funationally isolated acts" in
subsequent tasks plays ån important;-role, but# as could be
expected, there is also an indication that systematic errors
caused by misinterpretations and operational "procedure improve-
ments" play a much more significant role in the overall re-
liability of redundant systems. Therefore, to make probabilistic
prediction meaningful, strict control of the task sequence and
its content by constraints from equipment design is necessary
to limit effectively the possibility of improvisation and
"improvement". This also places a need for hard constraints
upon the managerial system, which can be the source of changes
leading to common mode errors.
In passing it should be mentioned that the causes behind the
dominant types of human errors can very probably be removed
through a proper design of equipment and work content. For
instance, equipment can be designed so as to link necessary,
but functionally isolated acts, tightly to other acts which
lead to immediate apparent functional effects if they are
omitted. From the present review of event reports it appears
that even a simple reliability analysis of the task sequence,
based on human reliability data presently available, can support
a redesign of the calibration task.
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TABLE NO. 2
HUMAN ERRORS IN TEST AND^CALIBRATION
Number of Channels
Affected by Error
1
2
3
4
17
Number of Cases
95
11
2
2
1

